Securing Digital Democracy Lecture 5 | Security Procedures







Voter Enfranchisement

Almost 1/3 of eligible U.S. citizens not registered!

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Voter Registration ApplicationBefore completing this form, review the General, Application, and State specific instructions.

Wil	I you be 18 years of ou checked "No" in	e United States of Amild on or before election response to either of a response to either of a structions for rules regard	n da	? Yes		0	This spa	ace for office use	only.	
1	(Circle one) Mr. Mrs. Miss Ms.	Last Name		First	Name	,		Middle Name(s	s)	(Circle one) Jr Sr II III IV
2	Home Address				Apt. or Lot#	City	/Town	,	State	Zip Code
3	Address Where You	ou Get Your Mail If Di	ffere	nt From Above		City	/Town		State	Zip Code
4	Date of Birth Mon	/ / hth Day Year	5	Telephone Num	ber (optional)	6	ID Numb	OET - (See Item 6 in the	he instructions for y	your state)
7	Choice of Party (see item 7 in the instruc	ctions for your State)	8	Race or Ethnic (see item 8 in the ins	Group tructions for your State					
9	 I am a United I meet the eliq subscribe to a The information knowledge un 	my state's instructi I States citizen gibility requirements any oath required. on I have provided in order penalty of perjuinay be fined, impri	s of r s tru iry.	ny state and e to the best of f I have provide	my ed false		Plea	ase sign full nam	ne (or put mark)	
os ca		gister-to-vote/app-			— Dal	e:	Month	/ / / Day	Year	_

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Please fill out the sections below if they apply to you.


If this application is for a change of name, what was your name before you changed it?

Α	Mr. Last Name Fi Mrs. Sissement Fi	irst Name	Middle Na	me(s)	(Circle one) Jr Sr II III IV	
If yo	u were registered before but this is the first time you are re	egistering from the ac	ddress in Box 2, what was you	r address where you	were registered before?	
В	Street (or route and box number)	Apt. or Lot #	City/Town/County State		Zip Code	
lf y	ou live in a rural area but do not have a street number, or if	f you have no addres	s, please show on the map v	here you live.		
	■ Write in the names of the crossroads (or streets) neare	st to where you live.			NORTH 🛧	
	■ Draw an X to show where you live.				-	
■ Use a dot to show any schools, churches, stores, or other landmarks near where you live, and write the name of the landmark. □ Example 및						
	Example 0					
	Woodchuck Road					
	Public School ●	X				
					T	
lf th	applicant is unable to sign, who helped the applicant fill out	this application? Give	e name, address and phone n	umber (phone numb	er optional).	
D						

Mail this application to the address provided for your State.

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




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SP Sound Politics Washi ×						
← → C 🗋 www.soundpolitics.com/voterlookup.ht	ml					
Sound Politics		_				
Washington State Voter Data	base					
This service provides online access to a public release of the Wash	ington State Voter Registration Database (February 29, 2012)					
You may search for voters by county and street address or by nam	e. Scroll down below the data entry form for instructions.					
County: All Counties (select one county if searching by addre	ess)					
Search by Address						
House Number: (Show entire block?)	Search by Name	Search by Name				
Prefix Street Name Type Postfix	Last Name:	Public				
Search by Address	First part of first name:	John				
or Search by Name	Sort by: 💿 First Name	Address				
Last Name: Public	S	earch by Name				
First part of first name: John Sort by: © First Name © Address						
Search by Name	ш					
Source by Training						

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Sound Politics Washington State Voter Database

	Last Name	First / Middle Name	M/F	Number	Street	City	Last Voted	Birthdate	Registered	PΑ
KI	PUBLIC	JOHN Q	M	100	MAPLE DR	REDMOND	2011-NOV-08	1950-JAN-01	1995-FEB-01	P

Data is from Secretary of State's Voter Registration Database public release of Feb. 29, 2012


MI/F: gender

Number: May include a suffix such as APT to indicate whether the registration record indicates an apartment. Click on the link to see all voters registered at that street address.

LastVoted: The date of the last election in which the voter is credited with voting (or blank if never credited).

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residential address
100 MAPLE DR
REDMOND, WA 98052

mailing address
(same as residential address)

county information
King County Elections
King phone: 206-296-8683
King email: elections@kingcounty.gov
King website: http://www.kingcounty.gov/elections


ballot delivery method
Postal Mail

update my address

this is

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first name WHAT COULD GO WRONG? JOHN middle name last name PUBLIC gender ▾ date of birth month year 1950 driver license/ID # what is this?


5.1 Voter Registration Securing Digital Democracy **□**☆ **⑤ ≡** www.highprogramn First Name: John. Middle Initial: **Unique ID** Public Last Name: Other tools: Driver's License Calc Driver's License Anal Driver's License Anal Date of Birth: D Driver's License Number: PUBLIJQ502BA or PUBLIJQ502SA Driver's License Calc Month: 01This algorit Driver's License Calc Driver's License Calc receiving inco Driver's License Calc Day: 01 Driver's License Calc How this wo Driver's License Calc First Name Middle In Submit First Name Machine Readable P

Machine Readable P

Middle Init Soundex Coding

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Washington State Identification Your information must match your Washington State driver license or ID

card.	
If you have a correction, make it and continue.	
first name	
JOHN	
middle name	
Q	
last name	
PUBLIC	
gender male	
date of birth month date year	
1 1 1950	
driver license/ID #	-

PUBLIJQ502BA

what is this?

continue



Voter Authentication








(left) Public domain image from Wikimedia Commons, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Mustermann_nPA.jpg (right) Image by DNI Electronico via Wikimedia Commons, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Dnielectronico.jpg Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 2.1 Spain license














5.2 Voter Authentication

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




5.2 Voter Authentication

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


VoterID?

Voter Enfranchisement









Looking Ahead...



Guarding against Tampering







Between polling and counting

At all times!









Tamper-Evident Seals









Image from Argonne National Laboratory Vulnerability Assessment Team http://www.ne.anl.gov/capabilities/vat/seals/index.html





Results for 244 Seals

	Mean	Median
Defeat time for one person	1.4 mins	43 secs
Cost of tools/supplies	\$78	\$5
Cost per seal attacked	\$0.62	\$0.09
Time to devise successful attack	2.3 hrs	12 mins


(19% use or in consideration for nuclear safeguards!)

(left) Image from Argonne National Laboratory Vulnerability Assessment Team, http://www.ne.anl.gov/capabilities/vat/seals/new.html (data) From Johnston et al., http://www.ne.anl.gov/capabilities/vat/seals/index.html


5.3 Guarding Against Tampering

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TECHNICIAN'S INSTRUCTIONS ALL MACHINES

Security Screw Cap (upper left hand corner) Insert screw into back of cap. Place numbered cap over screw. **Record number**.

Numbered wire seal (upper right hand corner) Insert numbered wire seal. Lock seal and remove excess wire. **Record number**.

Results cartridge seal – Insert plastic numbered seal. **Record number**.

AUDIO MACHINES

Tamper evident tape (3 pieces)

 Left hand side-place a piece of tamper evident tape from the e-box to the metal shroud horizontally.

5.3 Guarding Against Tampering

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Cup Seal

















5.3 Guarding Against Tampering

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Tape Seals







Evaluating a Seal Protocol

- ☑ Is the seal going to be in place when the attacker has access?
- ☑ Does the seal actually <u>need to be</u> <u>removed</u> to get in?
- ☑ Can the attack just <u>remove it temporarily</u> without leaving evidence?
- ☑ Can the attack <u>replace it with a new seal</u> without leaving evidence?
- ☑ Do election officials properly <u>record seal numbers</u> for each machine?
- ☑ Do election officials properly check the seal numbers later?
- ☑ Do officials <u>inspect for evidence</u> of tampering?
- ☑ If anomalies are detected, are they <u>recorded and reported</u>?
- ☑ Is <u>appropriate action</u> taken?

Adapted from http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~appel/voting/SealsOnVotingMachines.pdf






Old way: Evidence




New idea: "Anti-evidence"






Field Testing



5.4 Field Testing

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	<u> </u>							
Pre-Election Testing Mode								
Election	September 1, 2006							
Steal This Election								
Vote Center	3							
F	Princeton Vote Cente	r						
Unit 0 Vers	ion 2 Copy	1 Count 0						
Test Count View Ballot Results	Reporting Transfer Results	Clear Totals Set For Election						
Create Voter Cards	Accumulator	Supervisor Functions						
System Information SN System Total 89 AC Online No Battery								







Parallel Testing

What if problems are found?



Automated Analysis of Election Audit Logs

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Ana Maria Quevedo Miami Dade College Samuel Rodríguez
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University of California-Berkeley

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Abstract

The voting audit logs produced by electronic voting systems contain data that could be useful for uncovering procedural errors and election anomalies, but they are currently unwieldy and difficult for election officials to use in post-election audits. In this work, we develop new methods to analyze these audit logs for the detection of both procedural errors and system deficiencies. Our methods can be used to detect votes that were not included in the final tally, machines that may have ex-

In the November 2010 U.S. elections, 33% of registered voters were using Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting machines [22]. Federal standards require that electronic voting machines generate detailed audit logs for use during post-election audits. Unfortunately, while the logs contain large amounts of data, it is not immediately obvious what sort of useful information can be learned from the data. Furthermore, even simple tallies are cumbersome, time consuming, and prone to human error if done manually. For these reasons, election officials do not regularly perform countywide post-election of the log data.

https://www.usenix.org/conference/evtwote12/automated-analysis-election-audit-logs

nowever log data contain a trove of information that



Human Factors



Tracking Problems

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